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Abstract: We formulate several laws of individual and market demand and describe their
relationship to neoclassical demand theory. The laws have implications for comparative
statics and stability of competitive equilibrium. We survey results that o®er interpretable
su±cient conditions for the laws to hold and we refer to related empirical evidence. The laws
for market demand are more likely to be satis¯ed if commodities are more substitutable.
Certain kinds of heterogeneity across individuals make the laws more likely to hold in the
aggregate even if they are violated by individuals.
law of demand
The most familiar version of the law of demand says that as the price of a good increases
the quantity demanded of the good falls. The principal use of the law of demand in eco-
nomic theory is to provide su±cient, and in some contexts, necessary, conditions for the
uniqueness and stability of equilibrium, and for intuitive comparative statics. To guarantee
such properties in equilibrium models with more than one good, the familiar one-good law
of demand just stated is not su±cient|some multi-good version of the law is needed. In
its multi-good form, the law of demand is said to hold for a particular change in prices if
the prices and the quantities demanded move in opposite directions; in formal terms, the
vector of price changes and the vector of resulting demand changes have a negative inner
product.
In this essay, we will examine di®erent formulations of the law of demand. They di®er
principally in the domain of price changes over which the law applies. It is not always the
case that the law of demand is required to hold for all price changes: the version of the law
which is required for stability analysis and comparative statics varies from one context to
another. For each formulation of the law of demand, we discuss the conditions which are
su±cient to guarantee that it is satis¯ed.
To point out the obvious, the law of demand, in whatever form, is not a universal law at
all, but a condition which may hold in some situations and not others. It is well known that
in transactions where asymmetric information is an important consideration, violations of
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the law can occur. For example, lowering the price of a set of used cars does not necessarily
lead to higher demand if potential buyers think that the lower price re°ects the quality
of the cars being o®ered. (For a discussion of violations of the law of demand and other
issues which arise when price has an impact on the quality of the good being exchanged, see
Stiglitz (1987).) In this essay we make the classical assumption that the features of the good
being transacted are commonly known and independent of the price. As we shall see, even
in this classical setting, various forms of the law of demand will hold only under conditions
which are often neither obviously onerous nor obviously innocuous; in these cases, one must
necessarily turn to empirical work to ascertain whether or not the law holds.
We will use the notation and terminology of Mas-Colell et al. (1995, chapters 2, 3,
5) and assume that the reader is familiar with the basic consumer and producer theory
described there. We assume that there are L commodities and that the consumer is a
price-taker. The demand of a consumer of type ® with income w at price vector p =
(p`)L
`=1 À 0 is the vector x(p;w;®) = (x`(p;w;®))L
`=1 in RL
+, satisfying the budget identity
p¢x(p;w;®) = w for all p and w. Unless stated otherwise, we assume the demand function
x(¢;¢;®) to be C1. Then it has a Slutsky matrix of substitution e®ects S(p;w;®) with `j
element S`j(p;w;®) = @x`(p;w;®)=@pj + [@x`(p;w;®)=@w]xj(p;w;®). The Slutsky matrix
S(p;w;®) is the Jacobian matrix of the Slutsky-compensated demand function x¤, de¯ned
by x¤(q) = x(q;q ¢ x(p;w;®);®), evaluated at q = p. The term [@x`(p;w;®)=@w]xj(p;w;®)
is called an income e®ect since it approximates the e®ect on the demand for good ` when
income rises enough to compensate for a unit increase in the price of good j. If the consumer
chooses demand bundles by maximizing a well-behaved utility function then the Slutsky
matrix is symmetric and negative semide¯nite. The latter means that v ¢ S(p;w;®)v · 0
for all v 2 RL; in particular, the diagonal terms of the Slutsky matrix are nonpositive.
One-good and multi-good laws of demand
The term `law of demand' most often refers to the e®ect of price changes on consumers with
¯xed incomes. The law for a single good ` and a single consumer of type ® is
(p` ¡ ¹ p`)(x`(p;w;®) ¡ x`(¹ p;w;®)) · 0; (1)
for p and ¹ p, with pi = ¹ pi for i 6= ` and income w ¯xed. (In the strict version of the
law, the weak inequality in (1) is replaced by strict inequality when p 6= ¹ p; all the laws of
demand discussed in this article can be stated in their corresponding strict forms, though3








It holds if the substitution e®ect S`` is negative and larger in magnitude than the income
e®ect x`(p;w;®)
@x`
@w (p;w;®). If the consumer is utility-maximizing, then S`` · 0, so a
su±cient condition for good ` to obey the law of demand is that the demand for this good
is normal (@x`(p;w;®)=@w ¸ 0). If the demand for good ` is not normal, the price e®ect
@x`=@p` may be positive. This is called a Gi®en e®ect and good ` is called a Gi®en good.
All goods are normal and Gi®en e®ects are ruled out if the demand function is generated
by homothetic preferences or by a concave additive utility function (u(x) =
PL
`=1 u`(x`)),
or, more generally, by a supermodular concave function u, i.e., one in which all commodity
pairs are Auspitz-Lieben-Edgeworth-Pareto complements: @2u(x)=@xj@x` ¸ 0 for all j 6= `
(Chipman, 1985).
Gi®en goods are rarely observed. Sometimes demand for a durable good like oil may
increase with its current price if traders expect an even higher price in the future. However,
if commodities are distinguished by date, this is not a Gi®en e®ect since a future price
changes along with the current price. A possible example of a Gi®en good is proposed by
Baruch and Kannai (2002). They give evidence suggesting that, in Japan of the 1970s,
shochu, a cheap (and, by some accounts, nasty) alcoholic drink ¯ts the de¯nition. One may
explain the demand for shochu in the following way. A consumer chooses between sake
(good 1) and shochu (good 2). He always prefers sake to shochu, but he also must have a
minimum alcohol intake (which we ¯x at 1). Formally, his utility is u(x1;x2) = x1, subject
to the \survival" constraint x1 + x2 ¸ 1. If the consumer is su±ciently poor, both the
budget and survival constraints bind, with the consumer consuming as much sake - and
as little shochu - as possible. A fall in the price of shochu allows him to buy less shochu
and more sake and still meet his alcohol requirement; this he chooses to do since he always
prefers sake to shochu.
Turning now to multi-good laws of demand, let P µ RL
++ be a set of prices and let
X : P ! RL be a function representing individual or aggregate demand of ¯rms or of
consumers. The natural multi-good generalization of the one-good law in (1) is
(p ¡ p0) ¢ (X(p) ¡ X(p0)) · 0 (2)4
for all (p;p0) in some subset of P£P. If P is convex and open and X is C1, (2) holds on P£P
if and only if the Jacobian matrix @X(p) is negative semide¯nite at each p (Hildenbrand
and Kirman, 1988).
Suppose that the supply vector of the L goods changes from ! to !0. Let p and p0 be
corresponding equilibrium prices so X(p) = ! and X(p0) = !0. Then if X obeys (2) for all
prices, we obtain (p ¡ p0) ¢ (! ¡ !0) · 0. It is clear that this comparative statics property
and the law of demand on X are essentially two sides of the same coin. Note also that,
according to this property, an increase in the supply of good k, with the supply of all other
goods held ¯xed, will lead to a fall in the price of k.
Suppose that P is open and X obeys the strict law of demand; that is, X satis¯es (2)
with strict inequality for all p and p0 in P. This implies in particular that X is 1-1 and that,
for each ¹ ! in X(P), there is a unique equilibrium price vector ¹ p = X¡1(¹ !). A t^ atonnement
path for the function X ¡ ¹ ! is the solution to dp=dt = X(p(t))¡ ¹ ! for some initial condition
p(0) = p0 in P. We say that X ¡ ¹ ! is monotonically stable if each of its t^ atonnement
paths p(t) satis¯es djp(t) ¡ ¹ pj2=dt < 0 whenever p(t) 6= ¹ p. It is easy to check that X ¡ ¹ ! is
monotonically stable for every ¹ ! in X(P) if and only if X obeys the strict law of demand.
Furthermore, because P is open, a t^ atonnement path for X ¡ ¹ ! which begins at a price
su±ciently close to ¹ p = X¡1(¹ !) stays in P for all t > 0. Lyapunov's second theorem then
guarantees that the t^ atonnement path converges to ¹ p.
Laws of demand are thus useful as intuitive su±cient conditions for the uniqueness and
stability of equilibrium and for comparative statics. We will examine, in di®erent contexts,
circumstances under which they hold.
Law of demand for competitive ¯rms and consumers with quasilinear utility
For a ¯rm with production set Y , pro¯t maximizing net output vector y at price vector p
and ¹ y at ¹ p satisfy p¢y ¸ p¢ ¹ y and ¹ p¢ ¹ y ¸ ¹ p¢y. The net demand vectors x = ¡y and ¹ x = ¡¹ y
satisfy p(x¡ ¹ x) · 0 and ¹ p(x¡ ¹ x) ¸ 0, hence satisfy the law of demand: (p¡ ¹ p)¢(x¡ ¹ x) · 0.
Similarly, a consumer with utility function u(x0;x) = x0 + Á(x1;:::;xL) (quasilinear with
respect to good 0) and with su±ciently high income w satis¯es the law of demand on a
restricted domain, where the price of good 0 is ¯xed (say at 1). This is a special case of
the law for ¯rms. The consumer's optimal demand for goods 1 through L at p (the price
vector for goods 1 to L) and income w maximizes w ¡ p ¢ x + Á(x). This is equivalent to
pro¯t maximization with x an input vector and Á(x) the value of output.5
Bewley (1977) shows that a long-lived consumer with a random income stream and
a random but stationary time-separable utility, who is constrained from borrowing, will
accumulate savings so that the marginal utility of income is nearly constant. In the short
run, this consumer acts as if its utility is quasilinear with respect to money, and its short
run demands for other goods satisfy the law of demand. Vives (1987) formalizes Marshall's
idea (in his Principles) that consumer demands for goods with small expenditure shares are
close to demands generated by quasilinear utility.
Multigood Laws of demand for a consumer
Suppose the demand of a consumer of type ® is determined by maximizing a utility
function u®. The Hicksian compensated demand h(p; ¹ u;®) is a bundle that minimizes p ¢ x
subject to u®(x) ¸ ¹ u. Keeping the utility level ¯xed at ¹ u, this Hicksian demand function
satis¯es the multi-good law of demand: (2) holds for X(p) = h(p; ¹ u;®). Utility maxi-
mization also guarantees that x(¢;¢;®) satis¯es the weak weak axiom of revealed preference:
p ¢ x(p0;w0;®) · w ) p0 ¢ x(p;w;®) ¸ w0. Equivalently, for any ¯xed w, X(p) = x(p;w;®)
satis¯es (2) on the restricted domain with p ¢ X(p0) = w. This is also called the compen-
sated law of demand since the demand vector X(p0) remains barely a®ordable when the
price vector changes from p0 to p. The weak weak axiom is satis¯ed so long as the consumer
maximizes a complete preference relation; the preferences need not be transitive. When
x(¢;¢;®) is C1, the following are equivalent: (i) x(¢;¢;®) obeys the weak weak axiom; (ii)
its Slutsky matrix S(p;w;®) is negative semide¯nite (but not necessarily symmetric); (iii)
its Jacobian matrix @px(p;w;®) is negative semide¯nite on the hyperplane orthogonal to
x(p;w;®) (Kihlstrom et al., 1976; Brighi, 2004).
When we say that x(¢;¢;®) obeys the unrestricted law of demand (or law of demand, for
short) we mean that for each w, X(p) = x(p;w;®) satis¯es (2) for all price changes. Since
this is equivalent to negative semide¯niteness of the Jacobian @px(p;w;®) for all p, it is
stronger than simply saying that the diagonal terms of the matrix are nonpositive. Thus it
is not equivalent to the one-good law of demand for every good and does not follow from
the assumption that the demand for every good is normal.
Let M(p;w;®) be the income e®ects matrix, with `j component [@wx`(p;w;®)]xj(p;w;®).
From the Slutsky decomposition, @px(p;w;®) = S(p;w;®) ¡ M(p;w;®), we see that type
® satis¯es the law of demand if it satis¯es the weak weak axiom and M(p;w;®) is positive6
semide¯nite at each p. However, the latter condition is strong; it occurs if and only if demand
is linear in income for all goods, which excludes the possibility of luxuries or necessities.
A more promising approach is to ¯nd conditions under which the Slutsky matrix always
\dominates" the income e®ects matrix even when the latter \misbehaves." Assuming that
type ® has a concave utility function u®, a su±cient and (in a sense) necessary condition
for the law of demand is ¡[xT@2u®(x)x]=(@u®(x)x) · 4;8x. This result was obtained
independently by Milleron (1977) and Mitjuschin and Polterovich (1979) (see also Mas-
Colell et al. (1995, page 145) and an alternative formulation in Kannai (1989)).
An important application of this result is in the theory of portfolio decisions. In that
case, the demand bundle is the consumer's contingent consumption over L states of the
world; it is standard to assume that the consumer has a von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity function u®(x) =
Pl
i=1 ¼iv®(xi), where ¼i is the subjective probability of state i and
v® : R++ ! R is the Bernoulli utility function. Suppose the coe±cient of relative risk aver-
sion, ¡yv® 00(y)=v® 0(y), does not vary by more than four on the domain of v®. Then the
consumer's demand for contingent consumption at di®erent state prices will obey the law
of demand; this in turn implies that the law of demand holds for the consumer's demand
for securities, whether or not the market is complete (Quah, 2003).
Laws of market demand when the income distribution is independent of price
Consider a large economy with consumers drawn at random from a probability space
A £ R+ of consumer types and their incomes, with distribution ¹. The expected aggregate
(market) demand vector at prices p is X(p) =
R
A£R+ x(p;w;®)d¹. We are interested in
conditions under which X obeys the unrestricted law of demand, i.e., (2) holds for all price
changes; equivalently, @X(p) is negative semide¯nite for all p. If x(¢;¢;®) obeys the law of
demand for all ®, then, clearly, so will X. One justi¯cation for studying the law of demand
at the individual level is that it is preserved by aggregation.
Aggregating the Slutsky decomposition across all agents, the law of demand requires





v = v ¢ ¹ S(p)v ¡ v ¢ ¹ M(p)v · 0; 8 v (3)
where ¹ S(p) =
R
S(p;w;®)d¹ is the mean Slutsky matrix, and ¹ M(p) is the mean income
e®ects matrix, with `j element
R
[@x`(p;w;®)=@w]xj(p;w;®)d¹. (We assume here and
below that these integrals exist.) If all consumers obey the weak weak axiom, which they7
do if they are utility maximizers, then S(p;w;®) and hence ¹ S(p) are negative semide¯nite;
so @X(p) is negative semide¯nite if ¹ M(p) is positive semide¯nite.
The matrix ¹ M(p) is determined by the consumers' Engel curves x(p;¢;®) at p. Positive
semide¯niteness of this matrix is known as increasing spread (Hildenbrand, 1994). To see
why, note that
2v ¢ ¹ M(p)v = @t
Z
[v ¢ x(p;w + t;®)]2d¹(®;w)jt=0: (4)
We can interpret v¢x(p;w;®) as ®'s demand for a commodity (call it Tv), which is consumed
when the other goods are consumed; speci¯cally, the consumption of one unit of good j
requires vj units of Tv. Then
R
[v ¢ x(p;w;®)]2d¹ measures the spread of the consumers'
demands for Tv around the origin. By (4), ¹ M(p) is positive semide¯nite if and only if for
every v the consumers' demands for Tv spread out from 0 as their incomes rise. This is the
multi-good generalization of normality, where the consumers' demands for a single good
increase (spread from 0) as their incomes rise.
We now consider various interpretable conditions on the distribution of consumer char-
acteristics which guarantee increasing spread (and thus the law of demand). This property
holds if consumers have the same demand function and income is distributed with a non-
increasing density function ½ on [0; ¹ w] (Hildenbrand, 1983). In that case, integrating by
parts, (4) becomes 2v ¢ ¹ M(p)v = [v ¢ x(p; ¹ w;®)]2½( ¹ w) ¡
R
[v ¢ x(p;w;®)]2½0(w)dw ¸ 0. While
the nonincreasing density condition is strong, imposing some weak restrictions on the En-
gel curves will guarantee increasing spread for a signi¯cantly larger class of income density
functions (Chiappori, 1985). However, to guarantee increasing spread for every non-trivial
income distribution requires stringent conditions on the consumers' Engel curves: x(p;¢;®)
must lie in a single plane (depending on p) and the demand for each good is either a concave
or convex function of income (Freixas and Mas-Colell, 1987; Jerison, 1999).
Increasing spread is also implied by certain kinds of behavioral heterogeneity across
consumers. We consider consumers with the same income w and demands of the form
x`(p;w;®) = e®`^ x(e®1p1;:::;e®LpL;w), where ^ x is an arbitrary demand function and ® =
(®1;:::;®L) 2 RL. If ^ x is generated by some utility function ^ u, then x(¢;¢;®) is generated
by the utility function u®(x) = ^ u(e¡®1x1;:::;e¡®LxL). Increasing spread is guaranteed
if ® has a su±ciently °at density over RL. This condition also ensures that the mean
Slutsky matrix ¹ S(p) is negative semide¯nite even if ^ x, hence each x(¢;¢;®), violates the
weak weak axiom (and so is not generated by a utility function). Thus when ® has a
su±ciently °at density, X satis¯es the law of demand; in fact it can be shown that X is8
nearly generated by Cobb-Douglas preferences (Grandmont, 1992). Whether °atness of
the ® density implies heterogeneity (in some meaningful sense) of the consumers' demands
depends on the behavior of ^ x (Giraud and Quah, 2003).
Even when ¹ M(p) is not positive semide¯nite, i.e., v ¢ ¹ M(p)v < 0 for some v, it is clear
from (3) that v ¢ @X(p)v < 0 can hold provided the substitution e®ects are large enough,
i.e., v ¢ ¹ S(p)v is su±ciently negative. This feature can be exploited; for example, one can
substantially weaken the nonincreasing density condition in Hildenbrand (1983; described
above) and still obtain the law of demand if substitution e®ects are accounted for through
restrictions on the utility function (Quah, 2000). Similarly, a large enough positive income
e®ect can compensate for consumers' violations of the weak weak axiom, i.e., situations
where, for some v, v ¢ ¹ S(p)~ v > 0.
Whether the substitution e®ect v ¹ S(p)v dominates the income e®ect v ¹ M(p)v is an em-
pirical question. The sizes of the e®ects must be estimated. Haerdle et. al. (1991) show
how this can be done with cross section data under standard econometric assumptions,
without restrictions on the functional forms of the consumer demands. In most empirical
demand analyses, consumers are grouped according to observable attributes other than in-
come, and within a group, a, the consumers' budget share vectors are assumed to have the
form ba(p;w) + ², where ² is a mean 0 random variable with distribution independent of
income w. Under this assumption, a consumer's type is its attribute group and a realized
value of ². Within group a, the distribution of types with income w, denoted ¹a(®jw), does
not vary with w. Thus, if the income distribution in the group has a density ½a, then
Z




[v ¢ x(p;w;®)]2d¹a(®jw)g½a(w)dw;8v 2 RL: (5)
The left side of (5) equals 2v ¢ Ma(p)v, where Ma(p) is the mean income e®ect matrix
of the consumers in group a. The right side of (5) is the mean of the derivative of
R
[v ¢
x(p;w;®)]2d¹a(®jw) with respect to w. It can be e±ciently estimated by the nonparametric
method of average derivatives (Stoker, 1991). The mean income e®ect matrix ¹ M(p) is a
weighted average of the matrices Ma(p), weighted by the shares of the population in the
groups a. Condition (5), called metonymy, is weaker than the assumption that the budget
shares have the form ba(p;w) + ², so weak, in fact, that it is not potentially refutable with
in¯nite cross section data (Evstigneev et al., 1996; Jerison, 2001). Income e®ect matrices
estimated in this way using cross section expenditure data from several countries are all
positive semide¯nite (Haerdle et al., 1991; Hildenbrand and Kneip, 1993).9
Laws of demand in private ownership economies
In the last section, we assumed consumer incomes to be exogenously given independent
of prices. This is plainly not true in general equilibrium. For example, consider a private
ownership economy with consumers drawn randomly from a distribution ¹ over types, where
type ® has the demand function x(¢;¢;®) and an endowment vector !®. If the consumers
receive no pro¯ts, the income of type ® at price vector p is p ¢ !®. We are interested in
laws of demand that can be satis¯ed by the consumer sector's aggregate demand ~ X(p) =
R




The ¯rst thing to note is that under standard assumptions, both ~ X and ³ are zero-
homogeneous, and essentially for this reason, satisfy the unrestricted law of demand only in
exceptional cases (Hildenbrand and Kirman, 1988). However, if the consumers' endowments
are collinear (i.e., if for each ®, there is some k ¸ 0 with !® = k¹ !) then the su±cient
conditions for the law of market demand given in the previous section are also su±cient for
~ X (and hence ³) to satisfy (2) for p and p0 in P = fp 2 RL
++ : p¢ ¹ ! = 1g; in other words, the
law of demand holds for mean income preserving price changes. This is so because, when
endowments are collinear, a price change which preserves mean income also preserves the
income of every agent.
When we drop the strong assumption of collinear endowments, this restricted form of
the law of demand is not guaranteed even if all consumers have homothetic preferences
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995, page 598). However, it does hold when the consumer sector has
two properties: (a) all agents have homothetic preferences and (b) the preferences and
endowments are independently distributed. Quah (1997) shows that this scenario can be
understood as the idealization of a more general situation. The crucial feature of homo-
thetic preferences here is that they generate demand functions which are linear in income.
Retaining the independence assumption (b), one can show that when substitution e®ects
are non-trivial (in some speci¯c sense), ~ X obeys the restricted law of demand provided
the mean demand of agents with identical endowments is not `too non-linear' in income.
This last property can arise from an appropriate form of heterogeneity in demand behavior,
which can be modelled using the parametric framework employed by Grandmont (1987,
1992).
It is interesting to ask when aggregate consumer excess demand ³ satis¯es the weak weak
axiom: p¢³(p0) · 0 ) p0¢³(p) ¸ 0. This condition ensures that the set of equilibrium prices10
is convex in all competitive production economies with convex technology and constant
returns to scale; furthermore, it is the weakest restriction on ³ guaranteeing this conclusion
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995, page 609). The su±ciency of this condition hinges on the fact that
the production side of the economy satis¯es the law of demand. Since the equilibrium set
is generically discrete, its convexity implies generic uniqueness of equilibrium (up to scalar
multiple). When ³ satis¯es the weak weak axiom it also satis¯es the law of demand (2) on
the restricted set with p ¢ ³(p0) = 0. If (2) holds strictly on this set when p and p0 are not
collinear, then the unique equilibrium is globally stable under t^ atonnement, and there are
natural comparative statics.
Using a Slutsky decomposition, it can be shown that ³ satis¯es the weak weak axiom if
the mean Slutsky matrix S(p) is negative semide¯nite (as it is if the consumers are utility
maximizing) and the consumers' excess demand vectors spread apart on average when their
incomes rise. The latter condition is called nondecreasing dispersion of excess demand
(NDED). To formalize it, de¯ne z(p;t;®) ´ x(p;t + p ¢ !®) ¡ !®, the excess demand of
type ® with income transfer t. The corresponding aggregate excess demand is Z(p;t) ´
R
z(p;t;®)d¹. NDED holds if @t
R
fv ¢ [z(p;t;®) ¡ Z(p;t)]g2d¹jt=0 ¸ 0 for every p 2 RL
++
and every v with v ¢ p = 0 and v ¢ ³(p) = 0; in other words, the income transfers raise the
variance of the composite excess demands v ¢ z(p;t;®) (Jerison, 1999). Quah's 1997 model
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